Janeane B. Delker v. Leon V. Delker : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Janeane B. Delker v. Leon V. Delker : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Pete N. Vlahos, John W. Bradley; Vlahos, Sharp, Wight & Bradley; Attorneys for Appellee.
John M. Bybee; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Delker v. Delker, No. 920423 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4378
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




LEON V. DELKER, 
Defendant and 
Appellee, 







Appellate Case No. 920423-CA 
District Court No. 860996098 
Priority No. t€/ ? 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
UTAH 
PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
JOHN W. BRADLEY, #5447 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 6 21-2464 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee 
JOHN M. BYBEE, #5450 
795 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Telephone: 621-1300 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
1-tB 9 1993 
-•- 4Q(m\-nA Ltit- (A 
MarvT Nnonan 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




LEON V. DELKER, 
Defendant and 
Appellee, 





Appellate Case No. 920423-CA 
District Court No. 860996098 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
JOHN M. BYBEE, #5450 
795 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
Telephone: 621-1300 
PETE N. VLAHOS, #3337 
JOHN W. BRADLEY, #5447 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF 
PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 9 
POINT 1: THE APPEAL MUST FAIL ON THE BASIS THAT IT 
IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA 9 
A. JANEANE'S CLAIM COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
LITIGATED BUT WERE NOT 9 
POINT 2: THE ENTIRE 1986 JUDGMENT WAS SET ASIDE . . 13 
POINT 3: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES 15 
POINT 4: APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 
ON APPEAL 16 
CONCLUSION 17 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATUTE AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(i) . . 1 
Section 78-45-7.2 6 
U.C.A. 78-27-56 1 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. . 1 
CASES 
Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d 602, 604 
(Utah 1952) 1 
Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 
(Utah 1981) 8 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 
(Utah 1977) 1 
Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 
1289 (Utah 1980) 1 
Penrod v. Nu Creation Cream, Inc., 669 
P.2d 873, 874 8 
ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2 ) (i ) , stating 
that the Court of Appeals has appellant jurisdiction over 
appeals from the District Court involving domestic 
relations cases, including but not limited to divorce and 
property division. Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellant 
Procedure also indicates a procedure for taking appeals 
from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts. This Brief 
follows the structural requirements outlined in Rule 24 
of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure. This is an 
appeal by Janeane B. Delker, Plaintiff, from an 
Objection to a post divorce order on pre-trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the relief sought by appellant is barred 
by res judicata. 
2. Whether an order which was set aside on the 
basis that notice of hearing was defective applies to all 
or part of the issues addressed in that order. 
3. Whether section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code was 
improperly applied. 
4. Whether Appellee is entitled to attorneys fees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
The standard of Review on Appeal is that the 
Appellant Court must reverse only if there is a 
misapplication or misunderstanding of the law, if the 
1 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or 
conclusions or if there is a serious inequity that must 
be rectified. That is English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 
410 (Utah 1977) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Objection to a post 
divorce Order on Pre-Trial brought by Appellant's 
(hereinafter referred to "Janeane") Petition to Modify, 
heard by Commissioner Maurice Richards and entered by the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor of the Second District Court 
of Weber County on February 14, 1992.l R., page 239 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
After oral argument and proffers by respective 
counsels and after receiving exhibits, Judge Taylor 
upheld Commissioner Richard's Pre-Trial Order, finding 
that there had been no substantial change in 
circumstances to increase child support and that there 
was no substantial change of circumstances or other basis 
to make the child support retroactive. R., pages 247-249 
(Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and Subsequent 
All references are to the pages of the original record as 
paginated by the Clerk of the District Court, pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellant Procedure, Rule 25(e). All documents in the 
record referred to will be found in the Appendix in chronological 
order. For purpose of clarity, the following abbreviations shall 
be adopted by Appellee: 
R. refers to the record with its page number and title of the 
document in parenthesis. 
T. transcript. 
Orders). The Court further ordered that Appellee 
(hereinafter referred to as "Leon") continue to pay child 
support based upon his agreement with Janeane in August 
of 1990. R., page 248 (Order to Modify Decree of Divorce 
and Subsequent Orders). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties herein were divorced through a Decree 
issued by the State of North Dakota in 1986. R., page 7 
(Order). The North Dakota Court did not issue a decision 
regarding child support or custody of the parties' minor 
children, but declined to exercise jurisdiction to make 
these determinations, finding that the State of Utah was 
a more appropriate forum. R., page 7 (Order). Janeane 
filed a Petition to establish child support and custody 
of the three (3) minor children in the Second District 
Court of Weber County pursuant to the Order of the North 
Dakota Court. Leon received notice of a hearing 
scheduled on Janeane's Petition for September 9, 1986, 
but, in fact, that hearing was held on September 8, 1986. 
(this order will hereinafter be referred to as the "1986 
hearing/order"). R., page 20 (Judgment in Petition for 
Award of Custody Under UCCJA). That Order required Leon 
to pay Janeane child support in the amount of $116.00 per 
month per child. R., page 21 (Judgment in Petition for 
Award of Custody Under UCCJA). 
Leon subsequently made a Motion to Vacate that 
Judgment, which was heard on June 3, 1988. The Domestic 
Relations Commissioner held that Janeane's notice to Leon 
for the hearing to determine custody of the minor 
children was defective, in that it advised Leon that the 
hearing was to be on September 9, 1986, when, in fact, 
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the matter was heard on September 8, 1986. R., page 28 
(Amended Order on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment). 
The Court further reserved other issues to be decided at 
pre-trial on August 8, 1988. R., page 29 (Amended Order 
on Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment). Further 
hearing was held on August 8, 1988 in front of 
Commissioner Maurice Richards, wherein the Court 
addressed custody and also addressed child support to the 
extent that they noted that child support would be abated 
by one-half (1/2) during the summer visitations with 
Leon. R., page 105 (Recommended Pre-Trial Order). 
Child support had previously been set in 1981 by an 
administrative order issued through the Office of 
Recovery Services and which obligated Leon to pay child 
support in the amount of $75.00 per month per child. 
This Order was purported to be changed at the 1986 
hearing, which increased the child support to $116.00 per 
month per child. R., page 21 (Judgment in Petition for 
Award of Custody Under UCCJA). As explained above, 
however, this Judgment was set aside due to the lack of 
proper notice to Leon. R., page 27-29 (Amended Order on 
Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment). 
Janeane filed a Petition to Modify seeking, among 
other things, to increase child support, which Petition 
was filed on March 20, 1990. R., page 146 (Verified 
Petition for Modification or Judgment). Leon also filed 
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a Petition to Modify seeking custody of one (1) of the 
minor children and an adjustment of child support. This 
Petition was filed August 20, 1990. R., page 155 
(Verified Petition). Hearing was held before 
Commissioner Maurice Richards on August 24, 1990. Child 
support was discussed at that hearing and Commissioner 
Richards specifically found that the Petition for an 
increase in child support should be dismissed on the 
basis that there is no substantial change in 
circumstances. R., page 161 (Commissioner's notes). 
Janeane filed an Objection to that recommendation. R., 
page 166 (Objection to Recommendations). 
Notwithstanding the Commissioner's order that there 
was no substantial change* in circumstances, the parties 
voluntarily agreed that child support be increased from 
$75.00 per month per child to $116.00 per month per 
child. R., page 169 (Recommended Pre-Trial Order and 
Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause). Janeane's 
objection was not heard until February 14, 1992 at which 
point the Court held that the matter was res judicata and 
that there was, in any event, no substantial change in 
circumstances justifying an increase in child support. 
R., page 247-249 (Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and 
Subsequent Orders). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Janeane raises three (3) separate issues in support 
of her contention that child support should be raised 
retroactive to the initial administrative order of 1981 
or in the alternative, that child support be based upon 
the order entered in 1986, wherein Leon did not appear 
due to improper notice. Each of these arguments must 
fail because the issue regarding the increase of child 
support is res judicata. It was found to be res judicata 
by Commissioner Richards and that order was subsequently 
upheld by Judge Taylor. 
Janeane argues that the 1986 order does not set 
aside child support, but only sets aside the order 
relative to custody. This argument fails, both on the 
basis that the matter is res judicata and on the basis 
that the matter was set aside because of improper notice 
to Leon. The Court's entire order would be inapplicable 
to Leon because the entire order would be set aside where 
the underlying problem is improper notice to a party. 
Finally, Janeane's argument that the Court erred in 
applying Section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code in 
determining child support modification fails because the 
Court specifically finds that whether it considers Leon's 
actual change in income, or the change based upon the 
guidelines, no substantial change occurred. In other 
words, the Court specifically found that even when this 
7 
statute is not considered, there was no substantial 
change in circumstances. 
Because the matter is barred by res judicata, 
Janeane's entire appeal must fail. If not, her appeal 
must still fail on the basis that it was proper for the 
Court to set aside the entire default order rather than 
portion of it as argued by Janeane and because the Court 




POINT 1: THE APPEAL MUST FAIL ON THE BASIS OF RES 
JUDICATA. 
The doctrine of res judicata actually has two (2) 
branches, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim 
preclusion bars the relitigation by the parties of a 
claim for relief that was once litigated on the merits 
and resulted in a final Judgment between the same parties 
or their privies. The same rule also prevents 
relitigation of claims that could and should have been 
litigated in a prior action, but were not. Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Cream, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 874. Collateral 
estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation 
of issues that have been once litigated and determined in 
another action, even though the claims for relief in the 
two (2) actions may be different. Penrod at 875. In the 
case at bar, Janeane's claim is barred by claim 
preclusion. 
A. JANEANE'S CLAIM COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN LITIGATED 
BUT WERE NOT. 
As indicated above, the general rule is that claim 
preclusion bars relitigation of an action where that 
claim could and should have been litigated but were not. 
See also Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981). 
In the case at bar, Janeane had at least three (3) 
chances to litigate the issue regarding retroactivity of 
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child support, but failed to do so. 
The first chance occurred on September 8, 1986 in a 
hearing before Judge John F. Wahlquist. This is the same 
hearing which was later set aside on the basis that Leon 
did not have proper notice. Notwithstanding what later 
occurred, the Court's order with regard to child support 
simply provided as follows: 
It is further ordered, adjudged and 
decreed that $116.00 per month per 
child paid by the Respondent to the 
Petitioner and for child support. 
The only other provision with regard to child 
support makes mandatory income withholding available. A 
copy of this order entitled Judgment in Petition for 
Award of Custody Under UCCJA is attached hereto as 
Appendix "A". 
If Janeane was seeking to have child support be 
retroactive to 1981 when the administrative order was 
signed by Leon and which set child support at $75.00 per 
month, she should have presented it at that time. While 
there is no transcript or findings upon which the Court 
can determine whether the? issue was raised or not, it 
should not matter. If the issue was raised at that 
hearing, it is clear that Judge Wahlquist ordered that 
child support be increased to $116.00 per month from that 
point forward. If the issue of having child support 
retroactive to 1981 was not raised, then it is barred on 
the basis of claim preclusion because it should have been 
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raised. If it was raised, then it is also barred on the 
basis of claim preclusion because it had been litigated 
at that point and the Court entered an order which does 
not address retroactivity to 1981. 
The second opportunity to raise the issue occurred 
on June 3, 1988. At that point, a hearing was held in 
front of Commissioner Maurice Richards on Leon's Motion 
to Vacate the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in Petition for Award of Custody. Janeane could 
have argued at this time that child support be 
retroactive to 1981 or that the 1986 order which set 
child support at $116.00 a month, be applied, at least as 
to child support. However, all that is ordered in this 
hearing is with regard to setting temporary summer 
visitation and custody evaluations and reserves all other 
matters to August 8, 1988. 
The third opportunity that Janeane had to litigate 
child support was at the hearing of August 8, 1988. At 
this point in time, it is clear that the Commissioner had 
set aside the default order entered in September of 1986, 
which changed the child support to $116.00 a month. 
Notwithstanding this, it is also clear, based upon the 
Recommended Pre-Trial Order, that child support was 
discussed at least to the extent that child support would 
be abated by one-half (1/2) during the summer visitation. 
Janeane objected to the Commissioner's Recommended Order, 
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but limited her objections to the custody issue. Janeane 
could have and should have addressed the objections 
regarding retroactivity of child support and the setting 
aside of the child support order at the same time. 
A fourth opportunity came for Janeane to address the 
issues of child support. This occurred on August 24, 
1990. At this hearing, Janeane did object to the 
previous order regarding child support being set aside 
and did, apparently, argue about retroactivity of child 
support. In response to those arguments, Commissioner 
Richards specifically notes that at the time of the 
divorce, Leon earned $2,109.00 per month and that at the 
time of that hearing, he earned $2,324.00 per month. He 
further notes that Janeane's Petition to Modify was based 
on a change of circumstances and that Leon's obligation 
to pay child support was at $75.00 per month. Based upon 
these factors, the Commissioner recommended that there 
was no substantial change in circumstances and that the 
Petition be dismissed. At that point in time, Leon 
voluntarily agreed to increase child support to $116.00 
per month per child. 
Therefore, Janeane had the opportunity on September 
8, 1986; June 3, 1988 and August 8, 1988 to raise the 
issue, but failed to do so. The issue was not raised 
until August 24, 1990, but clearly could and should have 
been raised prior to that time. "When there has been an 
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ad judication, it becomes res judicata as to those issues 
which were either tried and determined or upon all issues 
which the parties had a fair opportunity to present and 
have determined in the other proceeding." Mendenhall v. 
Kingston, 610 P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah 1980). 
POINT 2: THE ENTIRE 1986 JUDGMENT WAS SET ASIDE. 
Janeane admits that the order and Judgment entered 
in 1986 was set aside based upon Leon's Motion to Vacate. 
However, Janeane asserts the argument that only the child 
custody issues were affected. This argument is without 
merit. The Court set aside the default order entered in 
1986 on the basis that notice given to Leon was improper 
because the date was incorrect. This makes the entire 
1986 Judgment and order void. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that a Judgment is void and subject to collateral 
attack if a lack of jurisdiction in Court appears on the 
face of the record. Bowen v. Olson, 246 P.2d 602, 604 
(Utah 1952) . 
In the Bowen case, Appellant was improperly served 
in an action to quiet title. Service was made by 
publication and by mailing a copy of the Summons. The 
facts showed that Plaintiff in the underlying case knew 
or could have known of an address to serve Appellant 
properly, but failed to do so. Appellant moved to set 
the default aside, but the lower Court dismissed the 
action because the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was 
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not made within one (1) year after its entry, even though 
Plaintiff knew of the Judgment within the year. The 
Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court's dismissal of the 
Motion to Set Aside on the basis that a default Judgment 
was subject to collateral attack at any time when that 
Judgment is void because the Court lacked jurisdiction 
over the matter. 
In the case at bar, the Court also lacked 
jurisdiction when default was entered against Leon in 
1986. In short, the entire default order was set aside. 
That order cannot be partitioned to say that a portion of 
it was set aside and a portion not set aside because the 
entire order was void due to the defective notice. 
Regardless of the language of the order or the fact that 
custody was the primary issue as opposed to child 
support, the entire order was set aside. It is 
ridiculous to propose that the Court was correct in 
setting aside the default order with regard to custody 
because notice was defective, but to assert that the 
default order was valid with regard to child support, 
even though the matter was completely resolved in the 
same hearing. The notice was defective, whether it was 
dealing with child support, custody or both. As a result 
of the defective notice, any order made by the Court 
would be void and subject to being set aside. 
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POINT 3: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Janeane argues that the Trial Court applied Section 
78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code incorrectly in finding that 
there was no substantial change in circumstances. 
However, a review of the transcript at the hearing shows 
that the Court's finding was not based solely upon this 
section of the Utah Code. Judge Taylor, in issuing his 
decision, said as follows: 
The case, while complex and 
convoluted and having gone through a 
lot of problems, from the stand 
point of the law, I think is fairly 
clear. On the child support 
modification, whether we consider 
the increase in his salary as being 
the determinative factor o_r whether 
we consider the support guidelines 
themselves to be the factor in 
either one of those analysis, the 
change is something less than 20%, 
which would not justify a finding of 
a substantial change in circumstance 
which would vest in the Court 
jurisdiction to make modifications. 
For that reason, the Court, in 
finding this is not a substantial 
change, denies the Petition. 
(Emphasis added). T., page 37 and 
38. 
The Court then clearly considered a substantial 
change in circumstances from two (2) points of view. 
First of all, it did consider whether there was a 25% 
difference between what Leon was paying under the 
guidelines as opposed to what he should be paying under 
the current guidelines based on Section 78-45-7.2 of the 
15 
Utah Code. However, it is also clear that the Court 
looked at a substantial change based solely on Leon's 
actual change in income over time and found that 
regardless of which way you look at it, his income did 
not substantially change sufficient enough to change the 
amount of child support. Janeane's argument, therefore, 
must fail because the Court's findings are sufficient to 
show that there was no substantial change in 
circumstances even if Section 78-45-7.2 of the Utah Code 
is not considered. 
POINT 4; APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
Pursuant to U.C.A. 73-27-56, in any civil action the 
court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action 
or defense was without merit and not brought or asserted 
in good faith. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 
33 further states "if the court determines that a motion 
made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, 
which may include single or double costs and/or 
reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. 
A frivolous appeal is one not grounded in fact or 
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. U. 
Rules App. Pro. Rule 33. Appellant's argument is not 
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well founded. The entire matter has been ruled on two 
occasions to be barred by res judicata. There has been 
no inappropriate application of law. The child support 
portion of the order entered in 1986 was set aside just 
as all other portions of that order must be set aside as 
a result of the notice of hearing being defective. 
This appeal is neither grounded in fact or warranted 
by existing law. As a result, appellee should be awarded 
his attorney fees and costs of appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Janeane's argument must fail for three (3) reasons. 
First, the Court has held that her claim regarding child 
support was barred on the basis of res judicata. Claim 
preclusion provides that you cannot relitigate a claim 
that has previously been litigated or which should have 
and could have been litigated but was not. Janeane had 
at least three (3) opportunities to litigate the issues 
presented in her appeal prior to the hearing in front of 
Judge Taylor. She failed to do so at that time and she 
should not be able to relitigate the matter at this time. 
Second, the entire default Judgment was previously 
set aside. The Judgment and order entered by Judge 
Wahlquist in 1986 was void because the notice given to 
Leon of the hearing was fatally defective. Once a 
Judgment is set aside, the entire Judgment is set aside. 
The notice cannot be defective for one purpose, i.e., 
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child custody and not be defective for another purpose, 
i.e., child support. If Leon did not have proper notice, 
then he did not have proper notice. The Judgment is void 
in its entirety and, in its entirety, is set aside. 
Finally, the Court found that there was no 
substantial change in circumstances, but did not base 
this findings exclusively upon the statute referred to by 
Janeane. The Court was very careful and very clear 
against finding that it considered both the change in 
Leon's actual income and the change in the guidelines in 
determining that there was no substantial change in 
circumstances . 
Based upon the above and foregoing reasons, the 
Trial Court's decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this 7 day of February, 1993. 
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & BRADLEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct 
copies of the above and foregoing Brief of Respondent 
were posted in the mail and addressed to Attorney John M. 
Bybee, attorney for Appellant, at 795 24th Street, Ogden, 
Utah 84401 on this y — 1993 
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APPENDIX A 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
RICHARD G. HAMP #4043 
Attorney for Petitioner 
385 - 24th Street, #522 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 394-9431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER, 
Petitioner, , 
v. 





1 Civil No. 
IN PETITION FOR 
CUSTODY UNDER 
96098 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on 
the 8th day of September, 1986, before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist, Judge of the above-entitled Court* The Petitioner 
was personally present before the Court and represented by her 
attorney of record, Richard G. Hamp of Utah Legal Services, 
Inc. The Respondent was neither personally present before the 
Court nor represented by counsel; however, a return of Personal 
Service being on file with the Court, Respondent's default was 
entered. The Petitioner was sworn and testified, the Court 
being fully advised herein, and having previously entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED, that Petitioner, JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER, be and hereby 
COPY 
DeiKer v. U^A.^*. 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
Civil No. 96098 
is awarded custody of the minor children, to-wit: Christopher 
Eric Delker, Nichole Joy Delker, and Jacob Lee Delker, of this 
marriage with reasonable rights of visitation in the Respon-
dent, LEON VERL DELKER. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that $116 
per month per child paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner 
and for child support. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREE that if 
the Respondent falls thirty or more days in arrears on his 
child support obligation, petitioner be and hereby is entitled 
to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 78-45D-1 et. seq. (1985). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Respondent be and hereby is required to maintain health and 
dental insurance for the minor children of the parties if it is 
available through his place of employment. Further, Respondent 
is required to name said children as beneficiaries on his 
policy of life and accident insurance. In the event the 
Respondent's insurance does not fully cover the medical and 
dental expenses incurred for the minor children, then the 
Respondent is required to pay at least one half of all medical 
2 
DeiKer v. ucx^ a^. 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
Civil No, 96098 
and dental expenses not covered by said insurance. 
DATED this day of __, 1986 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ELLA VAN BERKOM 





District Court Judge 
APPENDIX B 
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PETE N. VLAHOS, 113 3 3 7 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
.Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2 4 47 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone; 621-7464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LEON VERL DELKER, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED ORDER ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
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ana with IK-i attorney, Pi< lui l A. riummel, the Defendant 
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Defendant receiving effective not I t r ± a l , and t h e 
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LieiKei. v s . J ^ W J - ^ W -
Civil No: 960.98 
«• c)ur i- havinq 11ea rd arguITIent dealing with visitation for the 
summer, verification > •! the decree end/or custody of the 
minor child, and the court being fully cognizant nf all 
mattei s pertaining to therein, enters the following Recom-
mended Order n.n Defendard " ,, Mutjon IN r lcaN the Judgment it 
Petit ion for Award of Custody and the Interim PretiiaL ' n/dti 
is sc t toi t.ij a:-: fol lows : 
THE COURT RECOMMENnn AS i<uhhMW,-'-
1. . That the Plaintiff's notice to the Defendant for 
the hearing to detejinine lusiud; n( t hi-1 minor children was 
defective in that the Notice advised the DcLendaid t . i^ in 
court <,ii September 9 , 1986 and the matter was heard un 
September 8, 19 86. 
2. That the Defendant shall be allowed to [ J it u| Hit 
children i n nnn 19H8 it r;0f- ;. .m fn lake them back to 
Minot, North Dakota , provided ln*wtv» i M ' "In Defendant 
shall return Hie children back b; Ju.uy / so the cJiildren may 
attend the riaini > i '. .vr kin r t ,d 'he Defendant may then 
pick up the cliildren on July 9, 1988 and retain tHan D ick to 
Min^t, North Dakota for the balance of his numinei visita-
tion . 
That the matter shall be set one ]mni MiiMiei 
prefiJnl Mil Hicjiud ", 1988 at 11:00 a.m. 
AMENDED ORDER UN DEFENDANT'S 
Delker vs. Delker 
4, Tlint ill'.1 b^f endanf i ;• entitled to hav> a home 
study conducted in his home in M L H U L , Nortn udkou, H M iii'ni 
i | cy/^hol <""iQi ci J evaluation, provided however, rliac the 
Defendant shal ] be 1 i.'Sp* ;ns J h 1«• in it IH.1 ly \ i^r Hie expenses 
and who pays the final Lull will be an jssut> at tin t inu nt 
trLa I . 
r> . That both parties and th».- inidien ,*halJ m* ^ > >
 a t t, 
in an" psychological evaluation and/or home study, either in 
M O i t t i L ) d k ' » t t ' I " < t i c * 0 ( i t p O f I l L d h . 
i). 'IIMI ilaintifi ^hal L be entitled I ''-lei l^ iij 
t'onjii1 itraii^n wiih the children at ail reasonable times at 
Defendant's residence |1> N< ill, hdLntu, 
'I hat all other matters not resolved herein shall 
« S a o | |,(> , j^ir, , • « he pretrial scheduled for August «: , 1*588 and 
the children die to be present <>n t lid ou,. 
hi, i'tiat the child support during the two-month 
visitation thji Defendant has the children shall be abated 
in total. ^..?f/'1 
DATED this - l ^ ^ d a y of July, 1988. 
/S/MAURICE RICHARDS 
HONORABLE MAURICE RICHARDS 
Domestic Relations 
Commissi oner 
Apr- 'T'r' • ' FORM: 
AtrZ^,' <>{- ^ 
RICHARD A. HUMMfiL 
Attorney fox Defendant 
-7 
TNhyr^Mn^n n u n p p OM D E F E N D A N T ' S 
C i v i l No: 96098 
O R D H R 
"tdie Liljn'.i uh'i 1 i'l e q n i n t j Amended Recommended O r d e r 
as 
approved by I b> District Court on [hi'* d .-jy <d • • I .1r - , 
1 Q p P 
5 
DISTKHCabfGiaU 
COUNTY Ol' Wr^ER 
SJWJUDGE ' 
VY i HAT i HIS IS A TRUE COPY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING:: 
i n ;.:,L-.i ^ i ' - . ; - T ! r v \ I I H b 15 A I RUE COPY 
OF 1ML GR'O.NAL OM FILE IN"jMY OFFICfc. 
BN<5T:3 THIS . .c7. ... DAY OF LU.IQ: ! ? . £ { 
k]CFf3D R- SRtl-NE, COUNTY CHERK 2c * 
®Wt-WyO CL^^Cf;2nd Pl&f-CpURTM. 
^ A , < M M M ^ . >! /?.;, :JM&^y{^ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY M),M i Mi 1" / day of July, 1988
 r 
I mailed a true and correct copy oi the above ^n ' * iq 
AMENnFD ufMTT ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND 
INTERIM PRE-TRIAL REM MMENDEI OPDEP by p bio my r —'- . uhe 
U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the to I. low J uy ; 
Richard A. Hummel 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
385 24th Street, Suite 52? 
Ogden, Utah 8 4401 
/ 
S E C R E T A R Y / /^ 
AMENDED ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
APPEND i A -:: 
F!! F nnpy 
PETE N, VLAHOS, #33 3 7 
VLAHOSf SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 8 4 401 
Telephone : (801) fi ? ! - A 4 >, 1 
•
 I N T H E DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER, nka ) 
JANENE BUCKLEY DALTON, ) RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL 
) ORDER 
P.laintif f, ) 
v s . ) 
LEON ' /ERL DELKERf ) CfVII , NO: 9 60 98 
Defendant. ) 
This matter having come o n re guIa r1y f o r p r e-1 ri a 1 o n 
the H tii ddy ni August, i'JHH, before the Honorable Maurice 
Richards, Commissioner ut the Domestic Keiai. ions > «nr t and 
the Plaintiff appearing in person and with her attorney; 
Judztin Miyory i , .ind • 1|" Defendant appoirinq in ferson and 
with his attorney, Pete N. V!ahosf .nid repi^sen La i n -n1 
having beon made by Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant's 
attorney, depositions Ld/:en in ifnf n Pnf uta ri irmq been 
submitted to the Court, Affidavits and ofhei doruments 
havi i lg been .-nibmi f ted by Plainti ff ' s counsel; \ lie psycho-
logical report of the Detendant and .lu.' children lonvinc hp^n 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 1 
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5 ' u b m i f f rid to th^ Court, and the Court having accepted al l of 
said exhib i t s and having ULKAW d II le Defendant to withdraw 
trie deposi t ions at the conclusion ot the hear ing, and die 
OijuH nt'im; n-quest^d tf speak with i he three ( Ji minor 
ch i ldren , and tJie Court having a] utei WJMI < he ' 'ir^" I J) 
lmnui chi ldren outs ide the* presence of the p a r t i e s and 
having spoken O i lnji ' inhvi <ua I h'( md [ he Conr^ peing 
fully cogni'jviin of alL matters per ta in ing tlvrv c i 11 , a iders 
Mi l _J 11 Hv i nJ Recommended Pre -Tr ia l O^der and i s set forth 
6is follows; 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Thir ihi MircM (J) minor children love both their 
parents and like both the stepratner and stepinoth'-o oi ttu-:» 
respective parties. 
t, 'I'll it: the viiiMren d-< ii>^  1Mve friends at either 
place. 
3. Thai toUi homes are comparable and that, both 
parents and the respective stepparent:; qt~d„ JIUITI W*-J I I with 
the children. 
•i . "I'dd the P] a i i ltd ff has had the primary care of the 
children trom the time of the divorce and that; tdi* Defendant 
has visited regularly. 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 2 
5. That the children all : eel better or: v.*: the 
P1 a i n t i f f b u t w a n t t o ' o '• • - < • . t h e 
Defendant herein. 
6. Tl: lat all of the children agree that they like both 
homes equally. 
That, the Defendant's parents; or the children's 
• .. .-.ndparenti.- , reside in lit all and |»r i niarlly i n Weber County, 
8, That 1"he parties have agreed and stipulated that 
f: h e De f e nda nt * s parent s, o r t h e e hi1d r e n"s grandp a re nt s , 
shall be entitled to Hie Defendant ' n normal i-ihructi ired 
visitation as the Court applies it. 
9. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact, f h e C o u r t e n f e r s its P r e - T r i a 1 r e c o mm e i I d a f i o i I s a s 
follows; 
PRE-TRIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
] T ha f.th e Plain f iff s ha1 ] re ta i n the care, c u s t ody 
and control of the three (3) minor children. 
• 2 , That the Defendant shad 1 1 lave rummer WJ n i tat.ir>n i >1 
two (2) months each year, commencing' the Monday following 
wlv'ti N I M 'diii 1 ifn are released from,, school aixi shall bo 
entitled f»j pi eh up the children at 8:0u i.ni. MM in 0'iii(Li/ 
fol I .01: - . oh«_ d.ddren are released from school and 
shci * . * later at o:uU p.m. 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
3 . ThV *rr Per -endmt s h a h hn\- *'•/" i j r e : ^ : ill 
of the. c m . : L _ . . - *^ —iica-L r e c o r d o as 
needed . 
4. T h d f 11 * Defendant':' parents, or the children's 
crandparentii, Rail b^ enfitieu i i ii' i'of ^ ndant " ^imita-
tion rights whi^h the Court sets as follows: 
i II h \ t-i( )tij»if wH>chooih from Friday at 6:00 p.m. 
through Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
1,1») E v e r y o f h e r h o I i d a y e x c I u s i v e o f C h r i s t m a s E v e a n d 
Christmas Day turn: ieiriaj.ii xii ~h 
custodial parent's hero-, and r- : .. , ..e ar^ndnarei.L 
slid I 1 he. * . : -:. Cue ^nildren for one .ah:, i ~i 
the day. 
(c) That Defendant's parents are to have the children 
on Father' I i; legaiidless i ''/hose weekend, 
Plaintiff shall have the children for Mother's D. : . 
1 e s s <' > f w h o s e w e e k e n d . 
'" That the child suppuo t: sluil he abated, hy one-half 
during the two (2) months summer visitation that Defendant 
has the children , provided however; , that the Defendant shall 
be obligated to pay the costs of Lransportation b> and from 
Plaintiff"s residence in Layton, Utah. 
6. Thi:ii- each oh t VH-> parties shall assume and pay 
their own attorney fees and costs. 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 4 
STIPULATED ORDER 
1. That Defendant and his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, 
have stipulated that the Commissioner's Findings and Recom-
mended Order shall become the Order of the Court, and that 
no trial be set in connection with this matter. 
2. That the Court on its own finds that both parties 
have done an excellent job with the raising of these chil-
dren and commends the parents and the respective stepparents 
in their raising of the children. 
DATED this •' / day of -Attfttstr- 1988. 
3E-WCW 
HONORABLE MAURICE RICHARDS 
Domestic Relations 
Commissioner 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
£ DITH MAYORG2 t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
O R D E R 
The above and foregoing Findings and Recommended Order 
and stipulated by the parties to be a Final Order, was 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 5 
signed by the above-entitled Court on this J_ f day of 
1988 . 
RONALD 0. HYDE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of August, 
1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER by placing same in the 
U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Judith Mayorga 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Utah Legal Services, Inc. 
385 - 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
for purposes of ascertaining when said items were mailed to 
Plaintiff's counsel. 
STATE OF UTAH I,
 s s : 
COUNTY Or \/EBER j 
, H E R E 3 Y C ^ T ! P Y T H A T T H i 5 i ^ U | C ( ^ 
Of THE ORIGINAL ON i-lLt: ^ 4 ^ W 
; ^ ( DA^OFL/.tr^lt DATED THIS 
~HA^ 
BY 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 




SEP 2 0 1890 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ^3337 
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
24^7 Kiesel Aveijc 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANENE BUCKLEY DELKER, n/k/a / 






P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
1 EO'i VERL PFI KER 
Defendant. 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED 
ORDER ON ORDER TO 
SHOW C/>USE 
Civil N L . 860995098 
J u d a e 
This natter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
24th day of August, 1990, before the Honorable Maurice 
Richards, Commissioner of the Domestic Relations Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in 
person and with her attorney, John M. By bee, on Plaintiff's 
Petition to Modify the Divsrce Decree, and the Defendant 
appearing in "OT.on and with his ^tto^ney, Pete N. Vlahos, 
on Defendant's Petition to ''odify the Divorce Decree and or 
the Order to Show Cause, and representations having been 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Livii (No.: ttbuyybuys 
made by both counsel, and the Court having conversed with 
the minor child, Nichole, who was born on April 24, 1976, 
and the Court being fully cognizant of all matters pertain-
ing therein, enters the following Recommended Pre-Trial 
Order and Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause and is 
set forth as fol1ows: 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
1. That there is no substantial change of circum-
stances . 
2 That the parties voluntarily agreed to stipulate 
that the child support be increased from $75.00 per month 
ner civil l. o Silo.00 per month per child for the two ( 2 ^ 
minor children that „:il res'ioc with the Plain.tiff. 
3. That each party shall pay their own attorney fees 
and costs. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
"1. That the Defendant be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the minor child, Nichole, born April 2 4 , 1976. 
2. That Plaintiff be granted visitation rights as 
previously granted to the Defendant. 
3. That Defendant is to have the care, custody and 
control of said minor children immediately. 
RECOMMENDED PRE-T.^IAL 
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Civi 1 No. : 86099bUytf 
4. That the Defendant shall have the minor child for 
one (1) year and at the end of the year, the parties, or 
either of them, Cun petition the Court to modify this Order. 
5. That Plaintiff shall not be obligated to pay any 
support to the Defendant for the miner child, Nichole. 
6. That Defendant voluntarily agreed to increase the 
child support for the two (2) children residing with the 
Plaintiff to $116.00 per month per child even though no 
substantial change of circumstance. 
7. That Plaintiff shall be obligated to pay the costs 
of transportation for visitation with the minor child, 
Nichole, from Defend -:n :. ' s residence to the Plaintiff's 
residence and back to the Defendant. 
8. That each of the parties shall pay their own attor-
ney fees and costs. 
9. That either party can petition the Court prior to 
the expiration of one (1) year if they so desire. 
DATED this ^ ^ > day of September, 1990. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MAURICE RICHARDS 
MAURICE RICHARDS, 
DomeS't-'c Relations Commissioner 
Att/o 
'M. 8Y8EE, 7) 
ney for Plaintiff 
RECOMMENDED PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Civil No.: 8P0996098 
O R D E R 
The above and foregoing Recommended and Stipulated 
Pre-Trial Order and Recommended Order on Order to Show Cause 
signed and approved by the District Court on this 'J\£ day 
of September, 1990. 
STANTON .VI TAYLOR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ttm MT^YBEE, 
** \i -i>ey fo P7ainti ft 
QLRTiFlCATE OF MAILING 
Mailed a copy of the above and foregoing to attorney 
John M. Rybee, attorney for Plaintiff, at 47 North Main 
Street, Kaysv i11e, Utah 84037 on this _& day of 
September, 1990 for purposes of establishing when said Order 
was mailed to Plaintiff's counsel. 
Secretary 
RECOhflENDEO PRE-TRIAL 
ORDER AND RECOMMENDED 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
STATE OP UTAH } 
COUNTY OF WE3ER] 
I Heroby Ccr'tfy Ttat Th s 's A True Copy 
Of TftG OnQn?1 Or,rt"~ .n \*u Off CQ . 
DATED T H ' S ^ / DAYO> s ^ ^ i 9 < ^ £ ^ 
BENJAMIN A SIMS '>< 
CLER}K^ T H E COrJrT 
>ur 
APPENDIX E 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
/
 0 County of Weber - State of Utah 
IMZJL fr\ Ax/ i ksJUf F1LENO. Rf in99609f i 
TITLE- ( • PARTIES PRESENT) ^ 'COUNSEL: ( • COUNSEL PRESENT) 
JANEANE DELKER L/ : JOHN BYBEE IS* 
VS 
LEON DELKER 1/ . PETE N VLAHOSZ^7 
? 1 lt 
A. ASHBY 
— cum 
HON M. RTCHARDS 
TAPE DIGIT 
DATE: AnansT 24. 19 
J. HARTMAN 
"BSJOTT MARRIED: August 29, 1974 DIVORCE FILED: June 11, 1986 CHILDREN 
It/p My. IS far h* l A j ^ M / JAw Z W Crt 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
County of Weber - State of Utah / ^ oouniy OT vveDer - ^iaie OT uian . ^ ^  
0 IJ C HLENO. fttff* TITLE' ( PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL. ( COUNSEL PRESENT) 





£*&;. DATE: {j/^^f tO 
BAILIFF ^ /CL^^ 
itff - ]/ ft** li (jJU kui^A v IJUAM* i £u< WA 
L US .LM, AA VOUAK 
A4 U^J L^ ^j> J fruit ^ /si** Ct % P V / ^ 
P'/J. •--
 s j ^ J>Q k# &^<JJ C*AA W ^ L^ </ <L6* 
A^Cy ^ f^A -^c~ ^rtMvwV' 
•*r . y —*~-\f - - * • - y ••» -r 
APPENDIX F 
PETE N. VLAHCS, -2 23 7 
VLAHOS, SHARP - WIGHT 
Attorney for 3tfe%"c^rt 
Legal Forun Eui]dirg 
2447 Kiesel A\erue 
Ccden, Utah c — 2 1 
Telephone: £2.1-2-C-
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OE \<E3ER COUNTY 
STATE OF ITAH 
JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER, / 
(DALTON) 
/ FINDINGS OF FACT AND 




LEON ^ERL DELKEF, Civil No.: 9^098 
/ 
Defendant. 
This matter having come on regularly for urial on the 
14th day of February, 1991, before the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor, one of -he judges of the above entitled Court, 
sitting without a :ury, on Objection Hearing filed by the 
Plaintiff at the Pre-Trial, an Objection on the Recommended 
Order on Order to Show Cause, and the Plaintiff appearing in 
person and with her attorney, John M. Bybee, and the Defen-
dant appearing in person and with his attorney, Pete N. 
Vlahos, and the exhibits having been offered to the Court by 
the respective counsel, and the Court having asked the 
parties if these were the issues and both ax:torneys having 
answered in the affirmative and the facts being basically 
stipulated, and the Court being fully cognizant of all 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 
DELKER (DALTON) VS. DFLKER 
Civil No.: 96098 
natters pertaining therein enters the following Findings cf 
Fact: 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced m -he 
State of Nortn Dakota :r 1986. 
2. Thar the Plairtiff filed a Petition to establish 
child support and custody of the three miner children m the 
District Court of Weber County pursuant to an Order of the 
North Dakota Court. 
3. That a hearing was scheduled on the Plaintiff's 
Petition for September 9, 1986. but in fact said hearing was 
held on September 8, 1956, and that the Commissioner has 
previously found that there was inadequate and improper 
notice given to the Defendant as to the date and time of the 
hearing. 
4. That the Court en the September 8, 1986 hearing 
which has been previously vacated by the Court granted to 
the Plaintiff the custody of the three minor children and 
child support at the rate of $116.00 per month per child. 
5. That subsequent to said hearing, Motions and 
Affidavits were filed by the Defendant, along with a Memo-
randum to vacate the Order of September 8, and the Plaintiff 
also filed Affidavits and Memorandum the same. 
6. That in the interim the Defendant also filed a 
Petition for custody of the minor children. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 2 
DELKER (DALTON) VS. DEIKER 
Civil Ho.: 96098 
7. That a heari^c ras, held en the above ~attti en 
Jvre 3, 1988, arc a: said date and time, the Court r = de and 
entered an Order vacating the Order of September fa, c^^ause 
the Notice was defected ~nd. granted to the Defendant the 
terporary custody of tne children for purposes cf having 
psychological evaluations. 
8. That said matter was re-scheduled for August 8, 
1988 at 11:00 A.M. 
S. That the Ccurt en August 8, 1988 entered a final 
?re~Trial Order which til the parties agreed to wherein the 
Plaintiff was awarded :re care, custody and control of the 
minor children, and the support remained as previously 
ordered by the Court which had been established by the 
Office of Recovery Services in which a written stipulation 
signed only by the Defendant had been entered m North 
Dakota Court. 
10. That on or about March 14, 1990, the Plaintiff 
filed a Petition to Modify the Decree, asking for an in-
crease in child support and asking that the Child Support 
Order entered in September, 1986 of $116.00 per month per 
child be granted and that the Plaintiff be granted the 
judgement for the arrearages. 
11. That the Defendant filed an answer to the Petition 
alleging various defenses including res judicata. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 3 
DELKE? (DALTON) VS. DFLKER 
Civil No.: 96098 
12. That in August, -99C, rhe Defendant filed a 
"ttitior to rodify the Divorce Decree for rhe mi. or child, 
Nicky, born April 24, 1986 ard also filed an Affidavit in 
crder no show cause for temporary custody of the minor 
cMld, 
12. That a hearing was held on all issues en August 
24, 1990, and at that hearing, the Defendant was granted the 
care, custody and control of Nicky to be reviewed by the 
Court an a year and found no substantial change of circam-
sranc- tc irerease the child support. 
14. That the Defendant, by stipulation in an effort to 
settle the matter, offered to increase the child support to 
5116.CC per month per child for the two childrer remaining 
with the Plaintiff and now seek any child support, for Nicky 
which the Defendant has custody of. 
15. That said Order was entered and the Plaintiff 
objected. 
16. That the Court finds that there is no substantial 
change of circumstance for which the Court can increase the 
child support of August, 1990 to the present. 
17. That the Defendant has in fact been paying $116. CO 
per month per child for the two minor children and not 
receiving any assistance from the Plaintiff per the agree-
ment . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 4 
DELKER (DALTON) VS. DELKER 
Civil No.: 96098 
18. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff's request 
for the arrearage of child support from September through 
and including the present is res judicata in that said 
matter has been decided by the Court previously by that 
Order being dismissed. 
19. That the oldest child has a learning disability 
and will be eighteen (18) in December, and is only a 
sophomore. 
20. That said child may or may not complete school and 
may not continue tc go to school after his 18th birthday. 
21. That the Defendant is current in his child support 
on the basis of $116.00 per month per child for the two 
children residing with the Plaintiff., 
22. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff's Ob-
jections are res judicata as indicated herein and no sub-
stantial change of circumstances indicated herein. 
23. That the Plaintiff by agreement in open Court 
stated that the Defendant may have the permanent care, 
custody and control of Nicky, subject to the visitation 
rights as previously ordered by the Court. 
24. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact, the Court arrives at the following Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5 
D2LKER (DALTO:;) VS. DELKER 
Civil Mo.: 96098 
1. That the Defendart is entitled to :.ave the perma-
re:4. .are. nustccv ~ind contrc_ c" z^e minor child, -;icky, 
subject to visitation as herein after set forth. 
2. That the Plaintiff's claim for arrearage child 
support from September 8, 1986 tc arc including the present 
is res judicata and is denied; that said ratter had been 
previously determined by the Court. 
3. That there has been no substantial change of 
circumstance to increase the child support, but that the 
agraerent of th<= Defendant it August, ] 990 to pay SI 16.00 
per month per child for the two children residing with the 
Plaintiff shall remain in full force and effect. 
4. Ihat the Plaintiff shall have no obligation tc pay 
to the Defendant support for the miner child, Nicky. 
5. That there has been no substantial change of 
circumstance to justify any increase nor any legal basis to 
make the Child Support Order retroactive to 1986, and said 
increase in child support shall only become effective with 
the Court Order of August 24, 1990. 
6. That the Defendant shall continue paying support 
for the oldest child until the oldest child is eighteen (18) 
or graduates from high school; provided however, said child 
support shall not go beyond the child's nineteenth (19) 
birthday; and provided further, that if the oldest child 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 6 
DELKER (DALTON) VS. DTLKER 
Civi] No.: 96098 
drops out of high school, the child support shall terminate 
when he reaches the E oe of eichteen (18) and shall terminate 
anytime afrer he turns eighteen (18) and terminates :: he 
does net continue en 'with high school. 
7. That each cf the parties shall assume and pay 
their own attorney fees and costs. 
8. That the previous Order entered by the Court in 
connection with the above matter concerning visitation and 
abatement of child support as filed while the Defendant's 
visitctirr shall remain in full force and effect. 
9. That the Commissioners Recommended Order and 
Pre-Trial Order is approved except as modified by the Court 
at this hearing. 
DATED this day of May, 1992. 
STANTON; M. TAYLOR, 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JOHN M. BYBEE, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 7 
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CE. "IFICAJT OF FILING 
I u^reb^ ^-_t^I *^~t a fr1 z -~a correct: cop c~ "he 
above c, d norac^ing p ,rc: ~^ v_ z u c ; and Conclusions of 1 avv 
was posted JL- ~~e Umtf\ F4 a^es ra.I, postaae prepaid ana 
addressed to At:orne; "^c ^  y. 3ybee, attorney for Flairt-ff, 
at 795 24th Street, i- Cgden , Uta . 84401 pursuant to the 
Rules of Court 4-506 by allowing three (3) days for mailing 
and five (5) days prior to submission of same to the Court 
for Signature ~_ ~~a_-ir c same cr this / / &eY w I v-aY> 
19 9 2. 
Secretary 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
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Attorney for Defendant. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTLLLi' COURT OF WEB^R COUNTY 
^T^r-" r\Y UTA^ 
JANEANE BUCKLEY DELKER, / 
(DALTON) ORDER TO MODIFY 
/ DECREE OF DIVORCE 






This natter having come en regularly for trial on the 
14th day of February, 1991, before the Honorable Stanton M. 
Taylor, one of the judges of ~he above entitled Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in 
person and with her attorney, John M. Bybee, and the Defen-
dant appearing in person and with his attorney, Pete N. 
Vlahos, and the exhibits having been offered to the Court, 
and proffers of evidence having been made by both counsel, 
and argument having been made, and the Court being apprised 
that the parties basically agreed to the facts surrounding 
the matter, and the Court having reviewed the documents and 
the Court file having heard uhe argument of the respective 
ORDER TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS 1 
DELKER (DALTON) VS. DF.LKER 
Civil No.: 96098 
counselors and having rendered its Findir.es of Fact and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follov;s: 
1. That the Defendant: is entitled tc have the perma-
nent care, custody and control of the minor child, Nicky, 
subject to visitation as herein after set forth. 
2. That the Flaintiff's claim for arrearage child 
support from September 3, 1986 to and including the present 
is res judicata and is aenied; that said matter had been 
previously determined by the Court. 
3. That there has been no substantial change of 
circumstance to increase the child support, but that the 
agreement of the Defendant in August, 1990 to pay $116.00 
per month per child for the two children residing with the 
Plaintiff shall remain in full force and effect. 
4. That the Plaintiff shall have no obligation to pay 
to the Defendant support for the minor child, Nicky. 
5. That there has been no substantial change of 
circumstance to justify any increase nor any legal basis to 
make the Child Support Order retroactive to 1986, and said 
increase in child support shall only become effective with 
the Court Order of August 24, 1990. 
ORDER TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS 2 
DELKER (DALTON) VS. 17LKER 
Civil Mo.: 96098 
6. That the defendant shal] continue paying support 
or graduates from high school; provided however, said child 
support shall not oc beyond the child's nineteenth (19) 
birthday; and provided further, that if the oldest child 
drops out of high school, the child support shall terminate 
when he reaches the age of eighteen (18) and shall terminate 
anytime after he turns eighteen (18) and terminates if he 
does not continue on with high school. 
7. That each of one parties shall assume arc pay 
their own attorney fees and costs. 
8. That the previous Order entered by the Court in 
connection with the above matter concerning visitation and 
abatement of child support as filed while the Defendant's 
visitation shall remain in full force and effect. 
9. That the Commissioner's Recomimended Order and 
Pre-Trial Order is approved except as modified by the Court 
at this hearing. 
DATED this day of May, 1992. 
STANTON, M. TAYLOR, 
District Court Judge 
ORDER TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
AND SUBSEQUENT ORDERS 3 
DELKER (DALTON) VS. DECKER 
Civil No.: 96098 
APPROVED AS TO FORK: 
JOHN M. 3YBEE, 
Attornev for Plaint: 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Order to Modify Decree of Divorce and 
Subsequent Orders was posted in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed to Attorney John A. Bybee, 
attorney- for Plaintiff, an 7 95 24th Street, it Ogden, Utah 
R4401 pursuant to the Rules of Court 4-506 by allowing three 
(3) days for mailing and five '5} days prior to submission 
of same to the Court for signature by mailing same on this 
ftf day of May, 19 92 . 
a--
Secretary 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY 








CASE NO. 860996098 
i OGDEN, UTAH 
) FEBRUARY 14, 1992 
HEARING 
HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR, PRESIDING 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
MR. JOHN M. BYBEE 
Attorney at Law 
795 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
MR. PETE N. VLAHOS 
VLAHOS, SHARP & WIGHT 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
2 
THE COURT: Okay. This is Dalton 
versus Delker. Is the petitioner pre 
proceed? 
spared to 
MR. BYBEE: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Vlahos, is the 
defendant prepared to proceed? 
MR. VLAHOS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. VLAHOS: Your Honor, I do have a 
brief opening statement. If counsel 
that's fine. 
MR. BYBEE: Yes. I 
opening statement, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BYBEE: This is 
clarification, there's been a lot of 
does, too, 
-- I have an 
a -- for 
proceedings in 
this case -- this is a petition by the — or, yeah, 
by the plaintiff for modification of the child 
support award. 
At approximately the same time -- or a little 
after we filed the Petition to Modify Child Support, 
defendant filed a Petition for Modification of Child 
Custody for one of the children. 
At an Order to Show Cause that was held at the 
same time as the pretrial, the Commissioner 
3 
recommended that the custody of that particular child 
be changed. And although we filed an objection to 
that recommendation, we are not pursuing that. We 
are not pursuing the custody issue at this time. We 
have no problems with leaving the one child that is 
with the defendant; and the other two children are 
with the plaintiff. 
So what we're here on then is just purely the 
child support modification. Now, I went through 
the -- the file this morning and made copies of 
pertinent items that I need to bring to the Court's 
attention. They've been marked as exhibits, but 
they're all copies out of the court file. And I did 
that because there's so much in the file. I wanted 
to clarify it for Court and counsel. 
Exhibit Number Two -- I'll go through these in 
order. Exhibit Number Two — and I'll try and do it 
chronologically. So chronologically, Exhibit Number 
Two and Exhibit Number One, and then Three, Four and 
Five. 
Exhibit Number Two is a copy of the Order in 
the file from North Dakota saying that North Dakota 
did not have custody -- or jurisdiction of the 
custody matter between these two parties and it 
should be heard in Utah. 
~ r » W ^ - * ^ - T ^ r* C* O 
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Again, a little more background. These 
parties — he was living in North Dakota, she was 
living in Utah at the time of the divorce. They both 
had filed actions. And so that was the reason for 
that particular Order. 
The next thing is Number One is a Stipulation 
and Agreement signed by Mr. Delker -- who was the 
plaintiff in North Dakota -- and not signed by Mrs. 
Delker. This comes in July of '86. 
And the reason that I made a copy of this for 
the Court is down second paragraph from the bottom it 
talks about $75 per month per child in child support, 
and refers to a Utah Order. That particular Utah 
Order was a order made by Recovery Services 
administratively in 1981 when these parties first 
separated that he was to pay $75 per month per child. 
Okay. Next one, Number Three, this is dated, 
signed October of 1986, wherein it sets child support 
at $116 per month per child. Apparently -- there was 
not a copiy in the court file, and so I did not make a 
copy for this morning. Apparently, the divorce was 
granted in North Dakota in the summer of '86, which 
did not refer to child custody or child support or 
any of those items. And so the only matter that was 
taken care of in Utah then was the child custody and 
5 
child support. Okay, That's the third item. 
Number Four, as some background for Number 
Four, apparently there was some misunderstandings, 
miscommunications, typo errors on the hearing for 
child custody. It was set to be in Utah in September 
of '86. 
The defendant, Mr. Delker, filed a petition in 
'88 saying: I didn't get proper notice, and the 
notice I got said September 9th. It was actually 
held on September 8th. 
And there was affidavits filed back and forth 
and -- and the upshot of all of that was that there 
was a hearing held in June of 1988 wherein the 
judge -- the Commissioner recommended that the child 
custody portion of the Decree be set aside, that 
visitation be ordered, that a child custody 
evaluation be ordered. And if you'll look in 
Paragraph — Paragraph Eight of that particular 
Order, the only thing it says about child support is 
that during the two month visitation that the 
defendant had the children in North Dakota there 
would be no child support. So that's Number Four. 
Then we go to Number Five which is signed in 
October -- yeah, October of '88. This was the 
pretrial hearing held on August 8th, 1988, before the 
6 
Commissioner. The Commissioner recommended, after 
reviewing all of the custody evaluation and 
affidavits and letters and everything that's in the 
file, that the plaintiff continue having custody of 
the children; that Mr. Delker was, of course, to have 
visitation. 
And, again, the only thing said about child 
support is in Paragraph Number Five, that during the 
two months summer visitation, the child support will 
reduce by one-half. 
And then the next activity in the file is when 
I, on behalf of the plaintiff, filed a Petition to 
Modify the Child Support. 
Now, we have -- and then we -- and they filed 
their Petition for Change of Custody, and then we 
went to a pretrial in August of 1990 on our Petition 
to Modify and their Order to Show Cause and Change of 
Custody. 
At that time the position was taken by counsel 
for defendant and the Court that child support was at 
$75 a month. In fact, that's what he had been 
paying, $75 per month per child since the divorce had 
been entered. We had asked for a modification based 
upon increase in income. 
The defendant's position was -- was that based 
7 
Counsel's position was -- and the Court agreed 
with him -- that there had to be a 25 percent change 
in income• So that's the reason he recommended no 
change in the child support. 
Second issue is, we -- and I may be wrong. I 
mean, this is up for the Court to make a decision. 
The facts are pretty well not disputed. Mr. Delker 
8 
has a certain income; Mrs. Dalton now does not have 
any income. There's no dispute as to those facts, 
MR. VLAHOS: Oh, yeah, there is, 
Counsel. Go ahead. 
MR. BYBEE: Oh, okay. Excuse me. 
So a finding can be made on that issue. 
The other issue is, is we would like a finding 
from the Court today that the child support from 1986 
through 1990 was $116 per month per child and that 
we -- if there is an arrearage there that we need to 
do then an Order to Show Cause for child support 
arrearage for the difference between the $75 he was 
paying and the 116. 
So we have the two issues before the Court. 
We'd like relief on both of them and we would leave 
that in the discretion of the Court. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. VLAHOS: If the Court pleases, 
there is some very substantial differences in 
connection with this matter. Let me explain to the 
Court what happened in this particular case. 
There should be an affidavit in the file 
signed by both my client, his attorney in 
California --
T a n v i o C h i n r f l o C C; p 
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excuse me. 
MR. BYBEE: North Dakota. 
MR. VLAHOS: — or North Dakota, 
THE COURT: California was 
yesterday. 
MR. VLAHOS: Yeah. California was 
yesterday; North Dakota is today. I apologize, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: We tried a child custody 
case all day yesterday and we're both a little 
punchy. 
MR. VLAHOS: That's probably true, 
Your Honor. 
Let me tell you what happened. There was a 
hearing -- my client received a Notice for a Hearing, 
I think it was September the 9th in 1986, if I'm not 
mistaken. My client had retained an attorney in 
North Dakota, and my client fully intended on being 
here on September the 9th. 
And low and behold, the hearing was held on 
September the 8th. My client has always driven from 
North Dakota here to contest this matter. And when 
he called the clerk -- or his attorney called the 
clerk, whatever, they said, well, that hearing was 
today, tough. 
10 
You know, so his attorney immediately filed --
and it should be on file — an affidavit by the 
attorney, a motion, and then there was a Motion to 
Vacate that entire order. 
Now, during the interim, you'll -- the file 
again will show there were memos filed by both 
plaintiff and defendant in that particular case. The 
end result was we didn't come to a hearing on that 
until 1988, In 1988, the Commissioner found that the 
man did not get proper notice, and has never -- never 
had proper notice for that hearing. 
Now, the Order says custody of the children, 
but the Order is in regard -- I think if you'll look 
at the Commissioner's notes -- and I prepared the 
Order, I'll take responsibility for that -- the 
Commissioner set the whole thing aside because there 
was no notice. You've got an improper notice in this 
particular case. 
There are affidavits in the file. I've -- my 
problem is I've got two files with me and I've got 
another file that thick because at the same time 
these were going on, there was also a Petition to 
Modify the custody of the children, and all this was 
being heard. 
The end result is we had a hearing in June of 
11 
'88. My client got custody of some children for a 
few months. The Court was to make a final 
determination. There was some psychological 
evaluations in North Dakota; here; depositions were 
taken in North Dakota, here. 
Then we had a pretrial in August of 1988. At 
that time the Commissioner spoke with the children. 
The children wanted to go with their dad, wanted to 
spend the summer with their dad or a substantial 
period of time, and wanted to stay with their mother. 
At that time the Commissioner made an Order, 
and that Order was that the children stay with the 
mother in connection with this particular case. 
Now, that Order has stayed in place until 
these proceedings started, for this particular 
situation. Now, we have exhibits to show what my 
client's income was at the time of divorce, wre have 
exhibits to show what it was at the time of the 
pretrial hearing and what it is today. 
His total increase from the time of the 
divorce to the present has been 12 percent. That's 
been his total increase in reference to this matter. 
I think the evidence will show further that my client 
is clear -- is current in all payments. 
Now, if you'll look at the pretrial order 
I ^ n r i P S h i n c r l e * . C - 55 _ R . 
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entered in 1990, the Commissioner found -- found no 
substantial change of circumstance. My client agreed 
voluntarily, to see if we could put the matter to 
rest once and for all, that he would agree to pay the 
116 forward, and he has. 
So bear in mind, this man has paid faithfully 
every dime he was ever ordered to pay. Bear in mind 
that he pays 116 for the two children that are with 
Mrs. Delker, who's now remarried, and has not asked 
for any support for the child he's had custody of the 
entire time since the hearing. 
Now, our position is, one, Your Honor, this is 
res judicata in that when we had a hearing in 1988 
after the Commissioner had set aside the prior Order 
because of no proper notice. I don't think you can 
have a judgment entered where a person has not been 
given adequate notice. I think you'll find in the 
file that is absolutely correct. So the Commissioner 
set that aside. 
Then we had all this -- all the other matters, 
and at that time, all these issues were decided. 
That becomes res judicata, Your Honor. And then, 
like I said, from then -- then we move on to what's 
occurred in 1990 when counsel filed his petition. 











, all of a sudden, ah ha, I want to go back in i 
e this thing retroactive, when we've been to 
t least a half a dozen times for various 
Never raised. 
At all times Mrs. Delker was represented by 
At no time did she represent herself. So I 1 
ubmit to this Court two things: One, I think 
11 read the Commissioner's notes -- and if 
a Scribners error, I think there's allowance 
The Commissioner set the whole Order aside 





And I don't think you can get a judgment 
proper notice. That's like saying, you 
in court -- well, exactly what happened. You 
in court on the 9th, we get a judgment on you 
on the 8th, and whether you appear on the 9th, that's 
tough because it was -- a judgment was granted on the 
8th. 
That's exactly what happened in this case. So 
I submit, Your Honor, that the Commissioner's finding 
that there was no substantial change of circumstance 
is correct. My client has been voluntarily paying 
$116 per month per child and is willing to continue 
doing that. Clearly, I have — clearly, the one 
14 
child wants to remain with his — with her dad, so I 
don't see that as a problem. 
That's our position, Your Honor, and I have 
various documents relative to that. And I just want 
the Court to be aware that this Order that was 
entered in 1986, the 8th of September, there were 
affidavits filed by my client, his attorney, and 
motions filed by his attorney, and that's why I don't 
have them, but I -- in that file, it will clearly 
reflect this was not sat on two years. It was done 
immediately. Thank you. 
I can have my secretary, Your Honor, get the 
other thick brown file if you want and bring it over 
here, but I just didn't have enough space to bring 
it. 
THE COURT: Frankly, my dear 
Scarlet. 
MR. VLAHOS: Uh? 
THE COURT: I don't want to look at 
your file 
MR. VLAHOS: Well, I mean to bring 
over those documents. 
THE COURT: No, no, no. That's 
fine. 
MR. VLAHOS: As a matter of fact, I 
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COURT: Why d 
BYBEE: There 
be brought up 
He says eve 
by the copies 
notes in my file. 
the Commissioner's 
the Court has had 
Okay. 
Honor, may I amend 
on't you amend your 
is one additional 
and that goes on 
rything was set 
I've given the 
ther order concerning child 
for instance, 
had to be a 25 
the proper order was $75 per 
was to take the 
percent change and 
month per child, 
doesn't go to 1986. That goes to 1981 when that 
first -- that amount was first entered. 
So if the Court was to find, yeah, $75 per 
month per child is the correct amount -- you know, I 
find as a matter of law that through all these 
documents that it wasn't 116, it was $75 per month 
1 per child, then our change of circumstances doesn't 
2 go back to 1986. It goes back to 1981 when that 
3 Order was first entered. That — that's the other 
4 issue. If that's what the judge -- if the Court 
5 finds then --
6 THE COURT: Now, let me ask a 
7 question -- not to interrupt you. 
8 MR. BYBEE: Okay. That's fine. 
9 THE COURT: But I'll interrupt you, 
10 I guess. 
11 The divorce was granted in North Dakota. 
12 MR. BYBEE: Right. 
13 THE COURT: Presumedly the North 
14 Dakota Decree did not make an order concerning child 
15 support. 
16 MR. BYBEE: That's correct. 
17 THE COURT: The $7 5 was based upon 
18 an administrative order of the Office of Recovery 
19 Services, presumedly sometime after the divorce; is 
20 that correct? 
21 MR. BYBEE: No, no, no. That was 
22 made in 1981, five years before the divorce. 
23 MR. VLAHOS: Well, the stipulation 
24 is dated July 10th of '86 that my client signed, 
25 which is in the court files in the State of North 
1 / 
Dakota. 
MR. BYBEE: Right. 
MR. VLAHOS: And that's the 
stipulation that counsel indicated. That's the 
Order --
THE COURT: But that was based upon 
the $75 ORS Order of an earlier date. 
MR. BYBEE: Right. Right. Right. 
THE COURT: So the divorce was 
actually not granted or obtained until '86. 
MR. BYBEE: That's correct, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. VLAHOS: But the Stipulation, 
which is part of the file, states -- and I quote --
that the plaintiff should --
THE COURT: I've read it. 
MR. VLAHOS: Okay. 
MR. BYBEE: And, of course, that 
Stipulation was not signed by Mrs. Delker and it was 
just an exhibit. I'm not even sure why it was an 
exhibit. It was a North Dakota document that was put 
as an exhibit into a Utah case. And I wasn't 
representing Mrs. Dalton at that time so I don't know 
why they put that in there since it was not signed by 
1 her. 
2 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of 
3 the Decree from North Dakota? 
4 MR. BYBEE: I don't. 
5 MR. VLAHOS: And I didn't bring one, 
6 Your Honor. 
7 MR. BYBEE: I think Mr. Dalton has a 
8 copy. 
9 MR. DALTON: Which Decree are we 
10 looking for? 
11 MR. BYBEE: From North Dakota — 
12 Decree of Divorce from North Dakota. 
13 (Mr. Dalton tenders document to Mr. Bybee.) 
14 MR. BYBEE: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Would you show that to 
16 Mr. Vlahos? (Tenders document to Mr. Vlahos.) 
17 MR. VLAHOS: Well, this is Findings 
18 of Fact --
19 MR. BYBEE: And Order for Judgment. 
20 MR. VLAHOS: -- and Conclusions of 
21 Law. I don't see that as a judgment. 
22 THE COURT: They may -- they may 
23 delineate it differently than we do, if it says 
24 Order. 
25 MR. VLAHOS: The Court -- and I 
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s Findings of Fact and 
Do you have anything 
No. 
May I see it? 
The last -- yeah. The 
"Let judgment be entered I 
COURT: So there probably is a 





sometime in '86. 
Right. 
we either have $116 per 
or we have 75 per month 
If the 116 is correct, then we have a 
rt arrearage issue. If the 75 is correct, ; 
dification issue 
'86, but 
So we have an 
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or type of position here. 
1 
T a n r i o C h i n r f l o f ^ P 
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MR. VLAHOS: Well, except for one 
thing. The Commissioner found that in '86 --• which 
is the time of the divorce — is when the figures 
were used, whatever that may be. You can't go beyond 
the Decree. 
So what you're looking at is the Commissioner 
had the information before him. Counsel wasn't there 
in reference to it. 
MR. BYBEE: Right. 
THE COURT: Hold on just a second, 
please, Mr. Vlahos. 
MR. VLAHOS: Okay. I apologize. 
THE COURT: I'm taking a look at 
some things in the file and I'm having difficulty 
listening and reading at the same time. 
MR. VLAHOS: Okay. 
THE COURT: September 8th — that's 
the one you say you didn't get notice of; is that 
correct, Mr. Vlahos? 
MR. VLAHOS: He never — he got 
notice, Your Honor, but for the 9th. 
THE COURT: The 9th. And that would 
be understandable. The previous hearing was for 
August 9th, and, presumedly, they made a mistake 
on the -- transposing. 
21 
It's kind of fun to read through this file. 
One of the — well, it's nice to hear the kids saying 
really nice things about everybody. You know, they 
like their parents and they like their in-laws and 
their step-parents and that's -- that's wonderful. 
You don't see that often. So you're both to be 
complimented in that regard. 
So I understand it, it is the position of the 
parties — the petitioner feels that the $75 was 
instituted in 1981 by the Administrative Order, and 
then subsequently was changed by the divorce -- or 
the Decree of Judge Wahlquist in '86 to 116. 
MR. BYBEE: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And then there was a 
subsequent Order based upon an agreement in '90 when 
there was a change of custody situation. 
MR. BYBEE: '88. 
THE COURT: '88. 
MR. VLAHOS: No. The change of 
custody was in '90. You're right. The '88 --
THE COURT: That's where the 116 
came up again. 
MR. VLAHOS: Correct. 
THE COURT: Yeah. At that point the 
judge ordered 116 for the two children and --











The remaining two. 
— and no reciprocating 
Right. 
And then 
Mr. Vlahos, is the '86 Decree was set 
Hyde's subsequent Order. 
MR. VLAHOS: 
Richards in reference to it 
THE COURT: 
your position, 
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notice. 
THE COURT: Yeah, but the Order by 
Judge Wahlquist -- right. So that was set aside. 
MR. VLAHOS: I think this Court 
would have to set it aside as a matter of equity when 
there was improper notice to the parties. 
THE COURT: Well, I think the effect 
of Judge Hyde's confirmation of the Commissioner's 
Order is to set it aside. 
MR. VLAHOS: And we're willing to 
pursue -- to leave it as is, with her still not 
having to pay any money. And he is current. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me -- let me 
ask just for a proffer on a couple of points that may 
resolve some of the issues, at least in my own mind. 
Let me get the most current schedule here. 
MR. VLAHOS: If you're asking what 
the current support would be, I compute it at just --
THE COURT: Well, let's — let's do 
this kind of a computation. The -- the petitioner 
apparently doesn't have an income now, is taking care 
of the family. 
MR. VLAHOS: My understanding is, 
Your Honor, she told my client she's going to work at 
Hill Field at the Officer's Mess or the mess there. 
. T — r-% r> T-» 
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That's why I said, I dispute the fact she's not 
working, but I think imputed income can be entered. 
THE COURT: Well, yeah, I was going 
to suggest perhaps the appropriate way, even if she 
wasn't working, probably would be fair to impute 
income, since she's made a decision not to work, to 
take care of the family. 
MR. BYBEE: We were going to show 
her 1986 tax return when she did last work. And her 
gross income for 1986 was $3,016. That was prior to 
her marriage to Mr. Dalton. 
THE COURT: What — what I would 
probably --
MR. VLAHOS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: -- be inclined to do, 
would be impute minimum wage which is --
MR. BYBEE: 737 a month. 
THE COURT: Yeah, 737, 736, 
something in that area. Let's say 737. 
MR. VLAHOS: Your Honor, I've done 
that and I can give the Court some figures, if the 
Court wants. I've already done it. 
THE COURT: All right. Why don't 
you do that. Why don't you tell me the basis of your 
conclusion. 
- — ~ i ~ r* c n 
1 MR. VLAHOS: My client's current 
2 income — and that includes his most recent pay 
3 stub — he has an hourly rate. It's 13.95 or 2,418 
4 per month. I've computed that out and his gross 
5 income --
6 THE COURT: Well, let me — hold on 
7 just a second and let me -- let me do some figuring 
8 quietly on my own and then we'll talk about it. 
9 MR. VLAHOS: His gross is 2,418 a 
10 month. That's on a four and a third week basis. 
11 THE COURT: I'm not sure I have a 
12 current schedule. What is the current schedule? 
13 It's not the '89 one. 
14 MR. BYBEE: No, it's not. There's 
15 one in the Commissioner's office, if you'd like me t 
16 get that. 
17 MR. VLAHOS: I have it. Is that 
18 what you're looking for? 
19 THE COURT: Yeah. What's the most 
20 current one? 
21 MR. VLAHOS: This one here. 
22 THE COURT: I was looking at mine 
23 yesterday, but I must have put it in the papers. 
2 4 MR. VLAHOS: Wdll, it's the same 
25 one. I don't think it's been changed. 
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Your Honor, I 
said, it comes out t< 
736, for a combined 
7 6 percent that my c 
support on the three 
month per child. 
Mrs. -- well, 
is and I apologize -
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Dalton. My client would be o 
twice which is 375.96, minus 
portion for the one 
My client has 
half of which is for 
which is 
health a 
his income -- like I 
and I've taken her at 
3,154. That relates to 
Id pay. The child 
is 742, or 187.98 per 
know what her new name 
Dalton. 
-- Delker would be 
f 742, and that's $178. 
per month per child. 
since there are two 
Dalton. 
— Dalton, excuse me. 
rdered to pay 187.98 
59.36, which is her 
a net 316.60. 
nd accident insurance, 
the children. That runs about 
$35 a month. The bottom line is 281.60 as opposed to 
232. 
The Commissioner ordered -- if you'll take it 
on a basis of her income, I can represent to the 
1 Court — and I have an exhibit. He is exactLy the 
2 same thing he was right after in '86, a wage 
3 grade 10 - step four, except he's now a step five. 
4 But at the time of the divorce -- which I 
5 think is the period you have to consider -- he has 
6 had a gross income of 12 percent, and I've given it 
7 by the year, up to and including the present. If it 
8 will assist the Court I'd offer this --
9 THE COURT: Mr. Vlahos, please. I'm 
10 really trying to do some thinking and figuring on my 
11 own. I'd prefer that I be able to do that. 
12 This is your copy, Mr. Vlahos. 
13 MR. VLAHOS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Now, let me — let me 
15 kind of go through the figures as I've -- as I've 
16 perceived them. Figuring the obligation that would 
17 be assessable under the present schedule at the 
18 present time, based upon both of their incomes --
19 see, if -- see, if I'm -- we've got, basically, 736 
20 or 737. For sake of argument, Let's say 736 income 
21 imputed to the petitioner. 
22 You've got 2,418 which the parties apparently 
23 agree is his gross income per month. Right? 
24 MR. BYBEE: Assuming I can see a pay 
25 stub, I would agree on that. Assuming that's 
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correct, there's no problem. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. VLAHOS: He'll testify under 
oath that's what it is. 
THE COURT: If you have a pay 
stub — 
MR. VLAHOS: I don't have one, Your 
Honor, and he didn't bring one with him. 
THE COURT: Anyway, the total of 
that would be 3,155. If you run 3,155 for three 
children, the schedule would reflect $747, right? 
MR. VLAHOS: 742 was what I show, 
but I could be in error. 
THE COURT: Let me -- let's see. 
3,155. My schedule, and, in fact, your schedule, I 
think, would reflect 747, Mr. Vlahos. Why don't you 
check that. That's 3,155. 
MR. VLAHOS: Well, I apologize, I 
don't have my glasses on. Whatever the schedule 
says, I have no problem with. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anyway, it's in 
that area someplace. 
Now, if you -- if you divide the -- in 
determining what each share is then you -- you divide 
the 736 by 3,155 which would give you her percentage 
29 
share. As I recall, it was 23.3 percent or something 
like that. Somewhere between 23 and 24 percent. 
MR. VLAHOS: I come out 24 percent. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I think if we 
rounded it off correctly we'd come up with 24. The 
actual figure was 23.3 percent or something. 
If you multiply those figures out then, 23 
percent of 747, you come up with $174, which would be 
her share. And the balance would be $543, which 
would be his share for the three children. 
Is that consistent with your figures, Mr. 
Vlahos? Roughly, 174 and 543? 
MR. VLAHOS: I've got 5 63.92, but 
it's so close that, you know, it's not going to vary 
very much. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Now, if you 
figure the -- the schedule then, the total obligation 
each of them have is the 174 and the 543 for the 
three children. He has two -- or she has two of the 
children and he has one of the children. Her share 
then --
MR. BYBEE: Excuse me, Your Honor. 
Your figures are 174 and 543? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. BYBEE: But that only adds up to 
30 
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he is current with those payments. 
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Oh, which is 232. 
— 232, you come up with 
Okay. 
And if you figure that 
ge basis, there's only -- well, it's 
or something difference between what 
and under the 
seems to me to 
issue, dependi 
assess the 116; and -- and 
substantial c 
new guidelines what he 
be two specific issues: 
ng on at what point we 
whether there's a 
hange of circumstance that would justify 
a modification of the present support level. 
seeking to mc 
MR. BYBEE: 
idify 232. We' 
Now, the -- we're not 
re seeking to modify 
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whether it was 116 per child for three children, or 
75 per child for three children back in August of 
1990. The 232 that he's paying now was the 
Commissioner's recommendation based upon him 
receiving one child and her receiving two children. 
So our modification is not of the 232, it's 
the 116 or 75. 
THE COURT: Well, except that the 
Commissioner's Order concerning the 232 based upon 
the change of circumstance, the child going to him, 
would be an Order of the Court; and, therefore, 
that — that's, basically, what we would be 
modifying. 
If -- if we were going clear back, you know, 
of course -- obviously we'd be modifying the $75, but 
it sounds to me like the Commissioner's already done 
that. There was jurisdiction for that based upon the 
substantial change involving the change of custody 
which obviously opens up the whole thing so that we 
can modify all aspects that seem to be inequitable in 
view of the change. 
So that the -- the -- the ongoing order --
well, all right. Does everybody agree that 
essentially what has been presented to the Court 
would be the evidence that was going to be presented 
35 
by the — by the parties? 
MR. VLAHOS: Basically, correct, 
Your Honor, except — 
MR. BYBEE: Yes. 
MR. VLAHOS: — I do have the 
exhibit that shows his income in '86, '90, and even 
with his current rate, which I'm willing to give you. 
And like I said, I've calculated it out --
THE COURT: Why don't you hand that 
to Mr. Bybee and he'll have an opportunity to examine 
it. 
(Mr. Vlahos tenders document to Mr. Bybee.) 
MR. VLAHOS: There's a 12 percent — 
THE COURT: 12 percent from when to 
when? 
MR. VLAHOS: From '86 to the 
present. I -- I — in 1981, Your Honor, I don't 
think my client even can recall what his income was. 
THE COURT: I don't think what 
happened in '81 is probably a relevant issue anyway. 
MR. VLAHOS: And, also, I'd point 
out to the Court that the Notice is improper,, For 
one thing, it's improper. For another thing, we came 
into court in '88. The Court ruled on that. I think 
that's res judicata at that point. 
1 And we all agree, that was the Order provided 
2 that both parties agreed to have the pretrial order 
3 be a part of the Order. And it's set forth in that 
4 Order, 
5 THE COURT: The '88 — or the ~ 
6 MR. VLAHOS: '88. 
7 THE COURT: That was the — 
8 MR. BYBEE: Custody. 
9 THE COURT: That was the $75 order. 
10 MR. VLAHOS: That was — yeah. 
11 Everything was an issue at that point. 
12 MR. DALTON: With all due respect, 
13 Your Honor, in '88 — 
14 (Off-the-record discussion between Mr. Bybee 
15 and Mr. Dalton.) 
16 THE COURT: I know. I know. 
17 All right. Let's take a five-minute recess. 
18 MR. BYBEE: Okay. 
19 (WHEREUPON, at this time there's a recess, 
20 after which proceedings resume in open court as 
21 follows:) 
22 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me 
23 preface my comments by a statement that I hope that 
24 what happens here today is not going to effect the 
25 sense of cooperation that I've sensed in the raising 
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of your chi 
doing fine. 
And 
i say to you 
yesterday I 
parents in 
.ldren. And — and 
I guess on behalf 
thank you because, 
: was faced with a 
the situation were 
able to reconcile themselves 
in that regard, you're 
of society, I'd like to 
in candor, all day 
situation where the 
not — had not been 
to the fact that they i 
didn't like each other very much, and the impact that 
that was having on the child. 
Mr. Vlahos was involve 
sure that he will be inclined 






as good a position 
your children are. 
you for that. 
-- the case, while 
gone through a lot 
of the law, I thin 
d in that trial and I'm 
to agree that the child 
, psychologically, as 
And I would like to , 
complex and convoluted 
of problems, from the 
k is — is fairly clear. 
On -- on the child support modification, whether we j 
consider the increase in his salary as being the 
determinative factor or whether we consider the 
support guidelines themselves 
either one of those analysis, 
to be the factor, in 
the change is something 
less than 20 percent, which would not justify a 
finding of 
would vest 
a substantial chan 
in the Court juris 
ge of circumstance which 





Your Honor is 
think at the 




end of y 
that he is current. 
pay periods, 
And the fact 
THE 
and I th 
he might 
behind now because he 
third pay check in a 
consider that 
since August 
was the date 
VLAHOS: 




. be, you 
. hasn't 
particul 













and understand that that 116 
each for two 
isn't paying 
- that appears to 
Your Honor, I think 
ey take this out, and I 





It's based on 26 
way they work it. 
25 or 30 or $60 
that -- the 
ar month, we would 
The 116 per child was 





children is based upon 
anything back tc 
MR. VLAHOS: 
) him. 
that was -- that 
Right. 
right. And I --
two — you know, 
the idea that she 
Yes, we understand 






Okay. Right. Okay. 
